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Summary:
This paper shows how intra-stock relations, such as cannibalism and growth enhancement, define
the optimal sharing of a fish resource between heterogeneous harve sting agents. The sharing of
resources between different vessel groups is often left for political decision making. Nonetheless,
such decIsions may have both biological and economic consequences. This becomes quite clear
when different harvesting groups exploit different sections (age groups) of a stock that has
intra-stock interactions in the form of cannibalism. A two-agent bioeconomic model with
cannibalism is developed and used to determIne (i) optimal annual harvest sizes (T ACS) for cod,
and (ii) the optimal proportion of the T AC that should be harvested by the trawler and coastal fleets.
Applying biological and economIc data in a numerical procedure, and comparing the results
obtained to previous studies, it is shown that the presence of cannibalism has a significant impact on
who should take what proportion of the T AC, and hence, the standing stock size and discounted
economIc rent achievable. In sharp contrast to other studies, we find that the optimal harvest
requires that both trawlers and coastal vessels should harve st the fish resource. In addition, the
results indicate that from a bioeconomic perspective, the existing trawler fleets harvest share in the
cod fishery is too high.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the years fisheries managers in many countries have come to accept the concept
of bioeconomic management of fish resources. The application of bioeconomIcs has,
however, if at all, usually been limIted to the determInation of total allowable catch
(TAC), while the sharing of the T AC between heterogeneous fisher groups has been
thought to be a political issue. Hence, the fact that different fisher groups harvest upon
different sections of fish stocks, and thereby have different effects up on both stock
growth and the economIcs of the fishery, are not taken into account. That is, the
political determInation of harvest shares has bioeconomIc effects, for instance, in the
shape of reduced payoffs from the fishery, or even extinction. The bioeconomIc losses
could become quite serious when there is cannibalistic interaction between sub-stocks
within a single species. In this paper we study such cannibalistic interaction between
two sub-stocks that are fished upon by two separate vessel groups. We show how, in
the same manner that bioeconomics has become an important to ol in multispecies
management, a simIlar approach can be us ed profitably to manage species with intra-
stock interaction.
We develop a bioeconomIc model in order to study optimal harvest shares for two
vessel groups, namely, trawlers and coastal vessels, operating in the environment
described in the preceding paragraph. This is done using a cooperative approach to the
issue of sharing the harvest of the North-East Atlantic Cod stock. This stock is jointly
managed by Russia and Norway, the former country relying solely upon trawler
technology. These two countries get together annually to decide the total a1lowable
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catch (TAC), and their respective shares of this harvest. Furthermore, Norway must
determine how to divide the Norwegian share of the T AC between heterogeneous
fisher groups; that is, trawlers and coastal vessels, that harve st up on different sections
of the stock. In this paper we determIne the joint (cooperative) and separate (non-
cooperative) solutions to this resource sharing problem in a cannibalistic interaction
mode!.
Spulber (1985) introduces the problem of using lumped parameter models for non-
selective harvesting decisions in multicohort stocks. He shows how sustainable
harvesting may lead to extinction, if the total harve st is made up of excessive
harvesting of recruits or spawners. His analysis is purely theoretical, ilustrating the
problem by allowing a sole owner to harve st either selectively or non-selectively. We
apply the theory to a two agent situation found in an actual fishery. Sumaila (1997)
presents a multicohort model for the analysis of the management of the North-East
Atlantic Cod stock. However, this paper does not allow for cannibalistic behaviour
which we present (and which Eide (1993) shows to be an important explanatory
function of changes regarding the North-East Atlantic Cod stock). Armstrong (1997)
studies cannibalism and the sharing of harvests, but does not allow for optimal
harvesting in the buIld-up phase of the stock, such as is allowed in the current mode!.
Klieve and MacAulay (1993) analyse the Southern Bluefin Tuna fishery, where
J apanese and Australian fishers harvest on different sections of the stock. Klieve and
MacAulay (op.cit.) define different harvest strategies for the two countries with
respect to the choice of age at harvest. Applying the Nash bargaining solution concept
(see Munro, 1979), the authors determIne which strategy combinations give the
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highest joint payoff to the players. This approach differs from ours in that we do not
limit our study to the cooperative solution given by Nash (1953), which in itself gives
preference to one country when there is asymmetry between the countries.
Furthermore, we assume that the harvest strategies of the two vessel groups are
determIned by their existing technologies and their respective fishing grounds. Hence
we can determIne overall optimal sharing of the resource, after deciding the weights
that should be given to the two party's preferences.
Comparisons with earlier studies where cannibalism is not inc1uded, show that
cannibalistic interaction results in large economIc losses (see SumaIla, 1997). The
incorporation of cannibalistic behavior also affects how the annual harvest should be
shared optimally between the coastaland trawler fleets. We find that a shared harvest
is bioeconomIcally superior to a corner solution, in sharp contrast to earlier studies.
Furthermore, we find that the existing allocation rule applied by managers of the
North East Atlantic cod gives a sub-optimally high share of the total harvest to the
trawl fleet. In addition, the absence of cooperation between the two vessel groups
leads to stock levels well below the safe mInimum recommended by biologists (see
Jakobsen, 1993).
In the next section of the paper the bioeconomIc model is described. Following this is
a section presenting the North-East Atlantic Cod fishery, and the data from this fishery
that is applied in the model simulations. The results of the simulations are then
presented, followed by a discussion. Finally some concluding remarks are made.
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THE MODEL
We present a deterministic bioeconomic model, with two agents harvesting upon
separate, but interacting sections of a fish stock. Henceforth, these two parts of the
single stock wil be called sub-stocks, and wil interact via cannibalism and
recruitment. The agent interaction is modelled in a dynamic game-theoretic setting,
allowing us to study both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour.
We concentrate on a single-stock version of the two-stock model presented by Lotka
(1925) and Volterra (1928). Eide (1993) shows that this structure has a dose fit to the
biological findings regarding the changes in the North-East Atlantic Cod stock
throughout the eighties. We describe the changes in the biomass 1evels of the two
sub-stocks by the following difference equation:
LXi,t = Gi (xI,t_P X2,t_l) - hi,t' i = 1,2 (1)
where LX i ,t = Xi,t - Xi,t-I' and Xi,t is the biomass of sub-stock i at time t, with i=1,2
defining immature and mature sub-stocks, respectively. It should be noted that Xi, t can
be expressed in terms of weight and number of fish to get Xi,t = Wi* ni,t, where Wi is the
average weight of sub-stock i and ni, denotes the number of sub-stock i cod in period
t. The rate of harvest of sub-stock i, is defined as hi,t = aixi,tei,l , where ai is the
catchabilty coefficient of vessel group i, and ei,t is the number of vessels deployed by
i in period t.
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The natural growth functions Gi, of sub-stock 1 and 2, also define the interaction
between the two sub-stocks, and may be described as follows (Eide, 1993):
XII
Gi( X 1,1 X2,1) = rix l,( 1- --) - bx l,X2,1
L 2,1
X2,1
G2(XI,f' X2,1) = r2x2,1(1--).
a2xi,1
(2)
The parameters ri, ai and b are positive constants, with ri being the intrinsic growth
rate of sub-stock i. The parameter b determInes the cannibalistic interaction, where the
size of sub-stock 1 is negatively affected by that of sub-stock 2. By putting Xj into the
growth function Gi (i:j), as described in the bracketed terms in equation (2), we allow
for a recruitment relationship between immature and mature fish.
It is assumed that two different agents or vessel groups, that is, trawlers and coastal
vessels, designated 1 and 2, respectively, harvest upon each their respective sub-
stocks, 1 and 2. Hence vessel group i only harvests sub-stock il. Following SumaIla
(1997), we let the cost function of a given vessel type i in period t, C( ei,t), be defined
as:
C (e i, l ) = k 1 + roi e i, t
1 + ro
( 3 )
where ro = 0.01, and kil( 1 + ro ) "" ki is the cost of engaging one fishing fleet (or vessel)
for one year. Hence, the single period profit of vessel group i=1,2 can be expressed as:
i This is a simplification as there is overlap of harvesting, i.e. the coastal vessels harvest some
immature cod, and the trawlers harvest some mature cod. Nonetheless, the two vessel groups do in fact
target different sections of the cod stock. Armstrong (1997) shows that in 1993 almost 60% otthe trawl
harvest consisted of individuals less than seven years of age. More than 70% of the coastal vessel
harvest consisted of individuals seven years and older.
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7r i, = 7r ¡( Xi,/' ei,) = Vi hi, (xi,l ei,) - C( ei,) (4)
where vi is the price per unit weight of sub-stock i. The stream of discounted single
period profits of avessel group, Mi, i=1,2, is defined as:
T
M¡(xi,ei)= L8:7ri(xi,iei,l) (5)
1=1
Where 8 i = (1 + ri rI is the discount factor, and ri denotes the interest rate of player i.
Note that t=l.. Trepresents fishing periods, with T denoting the end period.
Under a cooperative regime, the goal of the cooperative agents is to find a sequence of
effort, ei,! and sub-stock leveis, Xi,i. i=1,2, to maximIse a weighted average of their
respective objective functionals (that is, their stream of discounted single period
profits):
Il(x l' Xz, ei, ez) = ßMz(xl' ei )+(1- ß)MZ(XI, ez) (6)
subject to the stock dynamics given by equation (2) above, and the obvious non-
negativity constraints. ß and (1- ß ) indicate how much weight is given to the own
objective functionals of 1 and 2, respectively, in the co operative management
problem. The following modified Lagrangian function can be set up for this problem
(see SumaIla, 1995):
L( X l' e l' X z' e z" y) = Il( X l' X z' e l' e z ) + yai - ( X l' X z' e l' e z ) (7)
where y is a modified Lagrangian in the sense of Flåm (1993);
T
ylt- (XpX2 ,ei ,e2):= L (YI,H(G¡ (XI,_pX2,1_1) - hl, - LXI,I) + Y2,IH(G2 (Xi,l_pX2,1_1) - h2,1 - LX2,1) J
1=1
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and
H(G,(X',H ,Xi,H) -h", - Ax",):= t
if (Gi (Xi,i_i , X j,I_I) - hi,i - LXi,l) -: O
otherwise
Under a non-co operative regime, the problem of player i is to fin d a sequence of
effort, ei,! and own sub-stock Xi,t (t = 1,2,...,1) to maximise his own objective
functional denoted by Mi, subject to the relevant constraints. For this problem, the
following modified Lagrangian function for each player can be formulated as:
T
Li (xi'ei;x j ,ej, y) = Mi (xi'ei) + L (Yi,IH(GJxi' Xj ,ei'ej) - hi,i - Óxi,l) J V i :l j (8)
t=l
The key difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios is that in
the latter each player maximIses without reg ard for the intra-stock interaction between
the two sub-stocks.
The solutions to equations (7) and (8) are pursued numerically using the solution
procedure developed in Flåm (1993). From these solutions, we can determIne the
stock-sizes under cooperative and non-cooperative interaction between the two vessel
groups. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium harvest of the two sub-stocks can also
be determIned. Summing these for each t we obtain the total optimal equilibrium
harvest in each time t.
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THE NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC COD FISHERY
The North-East Atlantic Cod stock is a highly mIgratory fish stock, travelling through
Norwegian and Russian exclusive economIc zones, as well as international waters.
Therefore Norway and Russia together annually determIne the total allowable catch
(TAC), giving each country approximately 45% each, with the remainder being
harvested by third countries. The Russian and third country catch is mainly harve sted
by trawlers, whIle the Norwegian share of the TAC (the NTAC) is divided between
two vessel groups; trawlers and coastal vessels. Since 1990 this division has been
determIned by a rule called the Trawl Ladder2. Upon the recommendation of
Norwegian Fisher's Association, which organises both vessel owners and fishers, the
Norwegian government chose to implement this allocation rule, which determInes
shares to the two vessel groups depending on the size of the NT AC. This rule
stipulates that a mInimum traw ler share of 28 % should be allocated when the NT AC
is below 130,000 tonnes. For higher NT ACs the trawler share increases, with a
maximum trawler share of 33%, when the NTAC reaches 330,000 tonnes. Since
almost all the non-Norwegian harvest is taken using trawl gear, this means that the
total trawler share is approximately 70%, when the T AC for the North-East Atlantic
Cod stock is large. This can then be compared to the optimal shares deri ved from our
mode!.
The parameter values used in the simulations are based on data from Norwegian fishing
vessels. The effort ei, i=1,2, denotes the number of vessels within each vessel group.
2 In actual fact, two different allocations rules have been implemented sequentially.
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Hence, the economIc parameters ki, ai and Vi are given the values in Table 1. Foreign
trawlers are assumed to face the same economIc and biological constraints as the
Norwegian trawlers.
The discount rate 8 is set equal to 0.07, as prescribed by the Norwegian Ministry of
Finance, while b is found by Eide (1993) to be 0.2023.
SIMULA TION RESULTS
Results pertaining to (i) discounted economic rents, (ii) harvest/harvest proportions,
and (iii) standing stock sizes are given in Tables 2,3 and 4, respectively.
Discounted economic rent
From Table 2, the following points can be made: First, we observe that the best total
economIc result (over 25 years) is NOK 30.71 bilion obtained when ß (which denotes
the preferences of the trawler fleet) is equal to 0.6. Of this NOK 13.35 and 17.36
billon are obtained from the trawl and coastal fleets, respectively. Second, under non-
cooperation, the potential economIc benefits are wasted almost completely, with the
coastal fleet and trawlers makng respectively, NOK 1.47 and 1.37 billon. Third, as ß
approaches O or 1, total rent dec1ines, an indication that allowing only the trawl or
coastal fleet to exploit cod does not produce superior outcomes. The latter two results
are in contrast to the results produced by SumaIla (1997); possible reasons for the se
differences are given in the discussion section of the paper.
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HarvesUharvest proportions
The results here rein force the points made under economIc rent above. We observe in
Table 3 that the optimal annual harvest computed, is 450,000 tonnes (when ß=0.6),
with the trawlers landing on average 198,000 tonnes, and the coastal fleet 252,000
tonnes. The best economic result is achieved when about 44% of the harve st is taken
by the trawl fleet.
Table 3 also shows that non-cooperative behaviour leads to disastrous outcomes as all
the harvest potential is virtually wiped out: the annual average harvest is only 78,100
tonnes.
In Figure 1 we observe that the optimal path of harest for both vessel groups is
increasing in the beginning of the 25-year period studied. After some time, however,
the coastal harvest surpasses the trawler harvest, about the same time as the trawler
harvest stars to decrease. Towards the end of the time period both vessel groups
obtain decreasing harvests due to both discounting and decreasing stock leveis. We
see that in the non-cooperative case both vessel groups obtain decreasing harvests, and
for all except the 1-2 first years, the non-cooperative harvests are well below the
optimal.
Stock sizes
In Table 4, we observe that the stock size that supports the best economic solution
occurs when ß=0.6 at 2.99 millon tonnes, with the stock sizes for the juvenIle and
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adult stocks at 1.86 and 1.13 mIllion tonnes, respectively. The table also reveals that
non-cooperative behaviour is disastrous to the health of the stock. Indeed, threat of
depletion is quite real here, as stock size is reduced to the dangerous level of about
0.26 millon tonnes, alevel that is well below the recommended 0.5 million tonnes
minimum spawning biomass for a sustainable cod fishery (Jakobsen, 1993).
We observe in Figure 2 that the optimal stock paths of both sub-stocks are increasing
in most of the time period studied. Towards the end of the 25 years, however, sub-
stock 1 starts to dec1ine, and is smaller than sub-stock 2 in the last year. This dip in
sub-stock 2 is a result of discounting the future. In the case of a lower disco unt rate,
this decrease does not appear. In the non-co operative case, the sub-stocks dec1ine
drastically, the mature sub-stock being the smallest. At its smallest, sub-stock 2 is just
over 6000 tonnes.
Sensitivity analysis
Table 5 shows that, as expected, with an increase in the cost of harvesting, the total
profit to the two groups dec1ines from NOK 30.71 to 29.60 bilion, but the profits to
the coastal fleet increases slightly, which means that the overall dec1ine is accounted
for by a decrease in trawler profits. Increase in costs also results in increase in stock
size and a decrease in the trawler fleet share from 44% to almost 42%. These results
are presumably due to the larger absolute harvesting costs of the trawler vessels. In
addition, the reduction in trawler harvest which necessarIly follows higher costs,
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leaves more prey for the mature sub-stock, allowing the coastal vessels to increase
their harvests while trawler harvest share decreases.
Increase in prices have opposite effects to those we observe for increase in costs: A
25% increase in price leads to an increase in overall profits from NOK 30.71 to 35.11
bilion. In this case, most of the gain in profits accrue to the trawler fleet. The effects
on coastal vessel profits are however very small, both in the case of price and cost
increases. In the case of price increase, the standing stock size decreases whIle the
harest share to the trawler fleet increases, for the same reasons stated in the above
paragraph but acting in revers e direction.
A reduction of the discount rate from 7% to 5% results in an all-round increase in
profits, leading to a total increase in economic rent of about 28% from NOK 30.71 to
39.27 bilion. Two somewhat surprising observations can be made from the table.
First, the stated decrease in the discount rate leads to about 5% increase in the
trawlers' harvest share. Second, as the agents become less impatient with this change,
one would have expected the stock to be allowed to grow larger. However, we see
from Table 5 that this does not appear to be the case.
A possible reason for the above observations is that we studyaverage sub-stock sizes
over 25 years. In the case of a decreased discount rate the agents are less impatient
regarding the increase in the sub-stocks, as viewed in Figure 2. Hence the sub-stocks
increase in size more slowly, but the juvenile sub-stock is, nonetheless, by the end of
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the 25 year period larger than when the discount rate is higher. This also explains the
increased share to the trawler fleet, whIch targets juveniles.
For an increase in the intrinsic growth rates, profits, harvests and stock sizes all
increase, as one would expect. It is, however, of interest to note that the trawler
harve st share is significantly reduced. One reason for this large decrease in trawl
harvest share is the fact that since ri UuvenIle intrinsic growth rate) is less than r2, the
growth in the mature sub-stock due to such changes is relatively greater than that of
the immature sub-stock, hence reducing the optimal harvest share of the latter.
Finally, Table 5 reveals that an increase in the catchability coefficients by 25% leads
to a decrease in the rent derived from the trawlers; and an increase in the rent from the
coastal fleet. The total economic rent increases by over 15%. Similar trends are
observed with respect to harvest, with the consequence that a significant reduction in
the trawler harvest share from 44% to just over 38% is required. When it comes to
stock leveis, we see from the table that the juvenIle stock size is lower at 1.76
compared to 1.86 millon tonnes in the base case. On the other hand, the mature sub-
stock level is higher at 1.25 compared with 1.13 millon tonnes in the base case.
To explain the above results, one should note that the catchability coefficient is a
measure of the efficiency of the fishing gear. Thus, what these results tell us is that an
increase in the efficiency of the coastal fleet by up to 25% wil be a very we1comed
thing, but a similar increase in the case of the trawler fleet wil be detrimental to both
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the economics and biology of the fishery, which is what one would expect given the
present degrees of efficiency of the two groups of vessels.
DISCUSSION
A close look at Table 2 shows that the economic rents derived from the coastal fleet
does not increase all the way as ß approaches O, as one would have expected. This is
presumably because the low immature stock that emerges for low ß values, as a
consequence of the nature of the intra-stock interaction in the model, wil not give
sufficient positive effects upon the profits accruing to the coastal group. A larger
immature stock (that comes as a res ult of a larger ß) is more to the coastal group's
advantage because of the recruItment coefficient az. However, this is the case on ly up
to a certain point, where high ß values increase the harvesting pressure from the
trawlers, and also reduces the size of the mature sub-stock 2.
As stated earlier, the maximum total profit of NOK 30.71 bilion is achieved when
ß=0.6. This outcome occurs when the trawler share of the total harvest is 44%. Hence,
it is optimal that the coastal vessels obtain a greater share of the harvest, in order to
reduce the predatory pressure on juvenIle cod. The actual trawler harve st share of
approximately 70% is well above the optimal share computed herein3. With the actual
foreign harvest of 55% all being taken by trawlers, our results show that not only
would it be advantageous for all the Norwegian quota to be taken by the coastal fleet,
3 We must, however, keep in mind that in actual fact the trawler and coastal vessels harvest to some
degree upon both sub-stocks. The effect of this upon the results is unclear, and is left for future
research.
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but some of the foreign harvest should be taken with coastal gear. This puts Norway's
somewhat half-hearted efforts to encourage a Russian coastal fishery in a new
perspective.
The actual harvest share allocated to the trawlers entails a much lower stock than the
optimum. In our model a 70% share to the trawlers would result in an average stock
size somewhere between 2.3 and 2.6 millon tonnes, while the bioeconomically
optimal average stock size is 2.99 millon tonnes. Similarly the actual trawler harvest
share would in equilbrium require a total harvest of between 270,000 and 320,000
tonnes, which is well below the optimal size of 450,000 tonnes given by our modeL.
Likewise the profits would be only approximately 60% of the best total profits. All
these clearly demonstrate that the current allocation is sub-optimaL.
An important point to note is that the trawlers not only compete with the coastal
vessels, but also with the mature sub-stock. Hence, the trawlers obtain the smaller
profit when there is no cooperation. Also we see that, as is expected, the profits,
harvests and stock sizes are much reduced in the non-cooperative case, compared to
the cooperative situation. The trawler harve st share is however markedly below the
actual harvest share. This is interesting from the cooperative viewpoint, as the non-
cooperative solution is often deemed to be the agents' threat point in a bargaining
situation. Even though there is no actual bargaining between trawlers and coastal
vessels on the international arena, it is of interest to note what pressure a Norwegian
coastal fleet could exert on the cod stock. It should be noted, however, that the trawler
share in the non-cooperative case is above the share that is allotted them in the optimal
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cooperative case, the difference being 2.2%. This can be seen as an argument for the
trawlers to obtain a larger share than that which our cooperative solution gives, hence
parly explaining their large share in practice.
The bioeconomic optimal total harvest is, according to our model, 450,000 tonnes.
This is well below the around 800,000 tonnes that has been harvested in recent years.
It should be noted, however, that our result also inc1udes low harvest levels in the
years of the bUIld-up of the stock, and at the terminal periods of the mode!. Hence,
explaining the divergence to the very large harvests in recent years. The average
harvest in the ten-year period 1984-93 is 357,000 tonnes (Anon, 1990, Anon, 1996).
In the last few years the harvests have risen to about 800,000 tonnes. However, the
latest signals from the biologists is that the T AC in coming years should be somewhat
reduced4.
Comparing our results with those of SumaIla (1997), we find that his non-
cannibalistic model gives higher harvests and thereby also higher discounted profits
than our mode!. This is due to the fact that, everything being equal, cannibalism
reduces the stock along with the harvests, but also presumably due to differences in
initial stock sizes used in the two models. Sumaila (op. eit.) obtains a corner solution
requiring that the coastal vessels in the bioeconomic optimal situation be sole owners.
In the current study, corner solutions are not obtained. The difference between the
results from the two studies lies mainly in the different age structure and selectivity
4 See Fiskeribladet, 28. October, 1997.
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patterns assumed in the two models. The results obtained in the current analysis also
gives far more devastating non-cooperative outcomes due to the same reasons.
We observe that the optimal profits and harvest shares are espeeially sensitive to
changes in the intrinsic growth rates. This underlines the importance of the biological
parameters in the mode!. The trawler harvest share is seen to be inversely related to
the stock size from the sensitivity analysis on the intrinsic growth rates, with the
implication that anything that increases the total average stock size, decreases the
trawl harvest share. Apparently, this is because of increased predatory pressure upon
the immature sub-stock that results from such increase.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
According to the findings of this study, in a bioeconomially optimal world, the
trawlers should obtain 44% of the harve st of cod, a proportion that is much lower than
the actual share of approximately 70% allocated to them.
Applying a Beverton and Holt model, SumaIla (1997) obtains a trawler share of
approximately 60%. SumaIla's result is determined by the Nash bargaining solution,
where the threat points play a central part. This model does not inc1ude cannibalism,
and thereby gives a trawler threat point substantially above the coastal vessel threat
point. We show that in the case of cannibalism this relationship is reversed,
presumably explaining some of the difference between SumaIla (op. eit.) and our
results. Armstrong (1997) obtains a trawler steady state harvest share of 52.4%, using
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a model that indudes cannibalism. This is above our overall average trawler share of
44%. However, in our model we inc1ude the build-up phase of the stock: It may be
the case that the coastal vessels obtain a higher harvest when average catches are
considered than when steady state equilbrium harvests are, hence bringing down the
overall average trawler share.
Central fisheries biologists in Norway have been sceptical to the use of harvesting as a
regulatory mechanism for cannibalistic species5, c1aiming that cannibalism is a part of
the natural regulatory process of the stock. However, there is little scepticism from the
same quarters when it comes to multispecies management, where the interaction
between different species is apparently not se en as natural regulation. This seems to be
a contradictory stance, whereby interactions within a single species harvested by
heterogeneous harvesters is not seen in a similar light as interactions between speeies.
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Table 1. Economic and biological parameter values (q, the catchabilty coeffieient, is
a per vessel value; k, the cost parameter, is measured in 106 NOK per year; while v,
the price, is in NOK/tonne; xo, the initial stock size, is in thousand tonnes). Vessel
group 1 consist of trawlers, while 2 describes the coastal vessels. Sub-stock 1 is
immature cod, while 2 is mature cod.
Sub-stock/vessel group i
1 2
rI 0.5003 0.6728
al 8.7608 1.1880
L 0.006650 0.001175
k3 18.602103 1.452341
v3 7579 8655
Xo 783900 280500
l r, the intrinsic growth rate, and a, the growth parameter, are determined in Eide
(1993).2 The catchability coeffieients qi are average values decided by the actual harests, the
vessel numbers (Anon., 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993), and the resulting stock sizes in the
years 1990-93.
3 The cost parameters are given by the weighted (with regard to number of vessels and
year) cost data in Anon. (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993). The price parameters are the average
prices that the two vessels obtained in 1992 (data from the Directorate of Fisheries).
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Table 2. Profits in bilion NOK (present value over 25 years), for l-:ß-:O, and for the
non-cooperative outcomes. Numbers in bold indicate the profits that ensure maximum
economic rent. Recall that ß refers to the preferences of the trawl fleet.
Profi
ß Trawl Coastal Total
0.1 2,39 9.40 11,79
0.2 4.19 9.29 13.48
0.3 7.93 11.80 19.73
0.4 11.27 14.95 26.22
0.5 12.89 16.94 29.83
0.6 13.35 17.36 30.71
0.7 13.14 15.27 28.41
0.8 14.18 7.85 22.03
0.9 14.22 3.05 17.27
Non-cooperative
1.37 1.47 2.84
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Table 3. Average harve st in million tonnes (over 25 years), for l-:ß-:O, and for the
non-cooperative outcomes. Numbers in bold indicate the harvest/arvest share that
en sure maximum economic rent.
Average harvest
ß Trawl Coastal Total trawl %
0.1 0.0337 0.1550 0.1887 17.9
0.2 0.0667 0.1710 0.2377 28.1
0.3 0.1200 0.2100 0.3300 36.4
0.4 0.1670 0.2520 0.4190 39.9
0.5 0.1910 0.2660 0.4570 41.8
0.6 0.1980 0.2520 0.4500 44.0
0.7 0.1980 0.2080 0.4060 48.8
0.8 0.2270 0.1010 0.3280 69.2
0.9 0.2380 0.0386 0.2766 86.0
Non cooperative
0.0361 0.0420 0.0781 46.2
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Table 4. Average stock size in million tonnes (over 25 years), for l-:ß-:O, and for the
non-cooperative outcomes. Numbers in bold indicate the harvest/arvest share that
ensure maximum economic rent.
Average stock size
ß stock1 stock2 Total
0.1 1.470 0.354 1.824
0.2 1.620 0.446 2.066
0.3 1.980 0.615 2.595
0.4 2.140 0.834 2.974
0.5 2.050 1.010 3.060
0.6 1.860 1.130 2.990
0.7 1.680 1.190 2.870
0.8 1.760 0.901 2.661
0.9 1,660 0.707 2.367
Non cooperative
0.1780 0.0839 0.2619
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: Profits, harve st and stock sizes giving maximum
economic rent, for an increase in the costs ki and k2, the prices Vl and V2, and the
intrinsic growth rates ri and r2, and catchability qi and q2, by 25%, and a reduction in
the discount rate, Õ, from 0.07 to 0.05. The base case in bold defines the optimal
results with ß=0.6. Profits are in bilion NOK, whIle the harvest and stock sizes are in
millon tonnes.
Profi Average harvest Average stock size
Trawl Coastal Total Trawl Coastal Total Trawl % stock1 stock2 Total
Base case 13.35 17.36 30.71 0.198 0.252 0.450 44.0 1.860 1.130 2.990
k t 25% 12.13 17.47 29.60 0.190 0.263 0.453 41,9 1.940 1.200 3.140
v t 25% 17.73 17.38 35.11 0.217 0.211 0.428 50.7 1.600 0,795 2,395
r t 25% 20.13 30.16 50.29 0.276 0.441 0.717 38.5 2.590 1 .460 4,050
q t 25% 12.91 22.52 35.43 0.188 0.304 0.492 38.2 1.760 1.250 3.010
Õ = 0.05 18.43 20.84 39.27 0.242 0.250 0.492 49.1 1.740 0.858 2.598
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Figure 1. Harest profies over a 25 year time period for the optimal cooperative and
non-cooperative cases. Note that harvest 1 and 2 refer to trawl and coastal fleet
harvests, respectively.
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Figure 2. Sub-stock profies over a 25 year time period for the optimal cooperative
and non-cooperative cases. Note that stock 1 and 2 refer to trawl and coastal fleet
stock sizes, respectively.
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